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Abstract
In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options when
their marital condition becomes bad. The voice option can be interpreted as a spouses
e¤ort or investment in the household to resolve his/her dissatisfaction and improve the
marital condition. If a spouse hopes to divorce, he/she chooses the exitoption. If a spouse
does not hope to express his/her opinion and divorce, he/she chooses the stayoption. We
focus on the role of exitand voicein a marriage and investigate the e¤ects of a divorce
law that is based on fault or no-fault on divorce rates. Our study shows that divorce rates
tend to be too high under a unilateral divorce law in the non-transferable utility case. On
the other hand, mutual-consent divorce law generates multiple equilibria, and divorce rates
are then ine¢ cient even in the transferable utility case. In this multiple equilibrium case,
divorce rates are determined by social factors, such as culture, norm, and religion.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Becker (1993) and Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) insist that the
Coase theorem applies to marital bargaining. To be more precise, a change in divorce law does
not a¤ect the divorce rate if bargaining can be done without costs within a marriage. However,
in the real world, the divorce law matters. In most of the U.S., the transition from fault to
no-fault divorce law occurred in the 1970s, and, simultaneously, the U.S. divorce rate rose
dramatically. Whether these two trends are linked or not has been throughly investrgated. 1 In
recent years, empirical studies have shown that the change to no-fault unilateral divorce laws
caused an increase in the divorce rate in U.S.. However, this e¤ect did not continue for long. For
instance, Wolfer (2006) shows that the divorce rate is largely a¤ected in the rst few years and
is not a¤ected in the following years by the transition to unilateral divorce laws. On the other
hand, a recent theoretical analysis shows that the change of the divorce law a¤ects the divorce
rate. For example, Rasul (2005) shows that the change to unilateral divorce law reduced the
marriage rate through a rise in the divorce rate. Clark (1999) and Fella, Mariotti, and Manzini
(2004) show that an ine¢ cient divorce may occur even under fault mutual-consent divorce law.
Moreover, Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2007) show that a change in divorce laws can increase
or decrease the divorce rate. Their research commonly shows that studying the e¤ects of divorce
laws on divorce rates and welfare is still important.
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of divorce laws on the divorce rates and welfare with
the exit-voice frameworkinitiated by Hirschman (1970). Hirschman reports that voiceand
exitare alternative means of dealing with problems that arise within an ongoing relationship
or organization. Voice is an option to state dissatisfaction, negotiate with the partners, and
try to restore the condition of the organization. If most members cooperate, the voiceoption
can improve the condition of the organization. On the other hand, the exit is an option to
depart from the organization itself.
A married couple is an organization in which a wife and a husband are partners. In the
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Hirschman (1987) reports that [m]odern marriage is one
of the simplest illustrations of an exit-voice alternative. When a marriage is in di¢ culty, the
partners can either make an attempt, usually through a great deal of voicing, to reconstruct their
relationship, or they can divorce. In this paper, we formalize an exit-voice framework of the
marriage market. To do so, we employ a simplied version of Mortensen and Pissarides(1994)
labor search model as our basic model.
In the research by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), workers search for a job, and rms
search for workers. When they are matched, they form a production unit. However, there is
a possibility that job condition switch from good to bad. Following their setting, we assume
that both the female and the male search for a marriage partner in a marriage market. Each
agent is randomly matched with another one, with whom he/she marries. A marriage always
1For example, Peters (1986) shows that the change to no-fault unilateral divorce does not a¤ect the divorce
rate in her empirical work. On the other hand, Allen (1992) reports that the change to no-fault divorce causes
a rise in the divorce rate. Then, Peter (1992) challenged the position presented by Allen (1992) in his paper.
Friedberg (1998) suggests that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws has caused an increase in the divorce rate
since the late 1960s.
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starts in a good state (happy marriage). However, a marriage in a good state changes to bad
(unhappy marriage) with constant positive probability per time. Therefore, in our model, there
are three states of any agent: single, in a marriage in a good state, and in a marriage in a bad
state. When spouses are in an unhappy marriage, each one chooses among the three options:
voice, exit, or stay. Exit means a divorce. On the other hand, we regard voice as an option
in which both a wife and a husband cooperate to restore a bad marital condition. To be more
precise, voice is an e¤ort or (post-marital) investmentwithin the household, and it costs. For
example, a spouse can express his/her opinions to another in a costly manner in order to resolve
his/her dissatisfaction. These opinions may be requests or claims for housework, expressions of
a¤ection, the disciplining of children, and money matters. If both spouses express their voice,
they may lead to a quarrel or an argument. A quarrel is, more or less, costly, although it may
serve to improve the marital condition. If a spouse does not hope to divorce or to express his/her
opinion, stay is an option.
We consider two cases: transferable utility and non-transferable utility. In the case of trans-
ferable utility, all possible costs are transferable. Then, the voice cost is equal among spouses.
On the other hand, in the case of non-transferable utility, the voice cost may be asymmetry
among spouses. We focus on the case of non-transferable utility in this paper, since it is gener-
ally assumed that utility is non-transferable in a couple (see, Zelder (1993), Fella, Manzini, and
Mariotti (2007)). Analysis of the transferable utility case is relegated to Appendix C.
The main ndings are as follows. The change in divorce law inuences the divorce rates and
welfare. First, let us assume that divorce law is unilateral, i.e., a husband (wife) can divorce
without the wifes (husbands) agreement. If the voice cost is higher for the husband (wife) than
for the wife (husband), then a husband (wife) may reject the voice although the voice maximizes
the sum of the spouses payo¤. Therefore, the voice under a unilateral divorce is often ine¢ cient
relative to the optimal case. In this case, equilibrium divorce rates are higher than optimal
divorce rates. Thus, our results indicate that divorce rates tend to be too high under unilateral
divorce law. Under unilateral divorce law, the factor that brings the economy about ine¢ cient
divorce is an asymmetry of the voice cost between a husband and a wife.2
Second, let us assume that divorce law is a mutual-consent law. Under the mutual-consent
law, multiple equilibria may occur. In other words, an ine¢ cient divorce or an ine¢ cient voice
may occur according to the social norms, culture, or religion. Under mutual-consent divorce law,
both the voice and divorce (exit) options need the agreements of both a husband and a wife for
realization. If both agents do not agree with each other, the couple continues to stay in a bad
marital condition, which lowers the utility of both agents. Then, if both agents agree with one of
two options, neither agent has an incentive to explore other options. In this multiple equilibrium
case, divorce rates are determined by social factors such as culture, norm, and religion. In a
society in which divorce is a bad behavior from an ethical viewpoint, agents in a bad marital
condition may hesitate to choose a divorce option and choose a voice option instead. In such a
society, divorce rates tend to be low when there are multiple equilibria. However, when there
are multiple equilibria, there may be too many couples who select a voice option: divorce rates
2 If the divorce cost is symmetric in couples, the equilibrium under unilateral divorce law is consistent with
optimal case. See Appendix C.
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are too low relative to the optimal condition, while asymmetry of voice cost induces too many
divorces. If the economy is in this condition, the change in divorce law from mutual-consent to
unilateral improves the welfare of the economy.3
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a basic set-up of
the model. In Section 3, we analyze the stationary distributions at equilibrium and compare
their welfare levels. In Section 4, we show the situation in which a marital sate becomes bad. In
Section 5, we study the non-transferable utility case and analyze the e¤ect of a unilateral divorce
law and mutual-consent divorce law on divorce rates and welfare of the economy. Section 6 is
the conclusion.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Time is continuous. There are a continuum of males (M) with measure 1 and one of females
(F) with measure 1. Each agent is at one of three states: single, in a marriage in a good state
(state g), and in a marriage in a bad state (state b). At the single stage, both the male and the
female get a ow payo¤ 0 and search for their marriage partners in a marriage market. On the
equilibrium path, each agent randomly meets another agent on the other side with a Poisson rate
a per time and marries him/her. When a marriage occurs, both agents enter into the marriage
in a good state. In a marriage in a good state, both agents get the ow payo¤ yg. However, a
marriage in a good state becomes a marriage in a bad state with the Poisson process with g per
time. In a marriage in a bad state, both agents receive the ow payo¤ yb, where yg > yb > 0. A
marriage in a bad state ends up in a divorce with the Poisson process with b. When a marriage
ends up in a divorce, both the female and the male become single and search for a partner in
the marriage market again. Every agent maximizes his/her lifetime expected discounted utility
with the discount rate r.
Here, we dene that u is the measure of a single M or F, and ej is the measure of marriages
in state j. Thus, it must hold that u+ eg + eb = 1.
In our model, we assume that agents in a marriage in a bad state can make an e¤ort to
restore the condition of the marriage. We call this e¤ort voice.We think that voice is a form
of communication, such as that which occurs during a quarrel between a husband and wife.
When a marital condition turns bad, a couple chooses a voice, a stay, or an exit option (divorce).
3The transferable utility case is an important benchmark, in which it is conrmed that the Coase theorem
holds and that the optimal options are chosen at the equilibrium if a husband and a wife coordinate on a Pareto-
superior action prole. The equilibrium is consistent with optimal case under unilateral divorce law when the
utility is transferable. However, when a husband and a wife cannot coordinate, multiple equilibria occur under
a mutual-consent divorce law. Then, in the transferable utility case without coordination, the change in divorce
law inuences the divorce rates and welfare.
Therefore, the ine¢ cient results are always caused by mutual-consent divorce law if a couple cannot coordinate
on a Pareto superior action prole. In both the transferable and the non-transferable utility case, mutual-consent
divorce law always generates multiple equilibria, and then the divorce rate and the voice are ine¢ cient. This
comes from the fact that not only voicebut also exitneed the agreements of both a husband and a wife under
mutual-consent divorce law.
4
Choosing a voice option, it costs vi = iv for i =M;F , and a bad condition becomes good with
a Poisson rate  per time, where M + F = 1 and  = M > 12 .
4 Voice is e¤ective only when
both partners choose it.
In addition, we assume that utility is non-transferable in the main text. The analysis of a
transferable utility case is in the Appendix C.
2.2 Stationary Equilibria and Divorce Laws
In this environment, we restrict our attention to the class of stationary equilibria. The candidates
for stationary equilibrium are as follows:
 Voice equilibrium; the voice option is exercised in every marriage in a bad marital state.
 Exit equilibrium; the exit option is exercised in every marriage in a bad marital state.
 Stay equilibrium; the stay option is exercised in every marriage in a bad marital state.
Generally, the option that is e¤ective depends not only on a spouses action but also on which
divorce law is applied. In this paper, we consider the following divorce laws:
 Unilateral divorce law.
 Mutual-consent divorce law.
The unilateral divorce law is one in which a husband (wife) can divorce without the agreement
of his wife (her husband). On the other hand, under a mutual-consent divorce law, a mutual
agreement is necessary before divorce.
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of divorce law on the condition under which the three
types of equilibrium are reached and the welfare at the equilibrium.
3 Stationary Distribution and Welfare
In this paper, we restrict our attention to the steady state. In this section, we derive stationary
distributions at equilibrium and compare their measures of the agents in each state, divorce
rates, and welfare levels. In a steady state, the measure of agents in each state, denoted by u,
eg and eb, becomes constant throughout time.
First, the stationary conditions of the voice equilibrium are
uV a+ eVb  = e
V
g g;
eVg g = e
V
b (b + );
4When we assume that F > 12 , the results in our model are sustained.
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where upperscript V represents that the variables are at the voice equilibrium. Since uV + eVg +
eVb = 1, we obtain
uV =
gb
a(g + b + ) + gb
;
eVg =
a(b + )
a(g + b + ) + gb
;
eVb =
ag
a(g + b + ) + gb
:
Second, the stationary conditions of the exit equilibrium are
uEa = eEu g;
0 = eEb b:
Then, we obtain
uE =
g
a+ g
;
eEg =
a
a+ g
;
eEb = 0:
Third, the stationary conditions of the stay equilibrium are
uSa = eSg g;
eSg g = e
S
b b:
Then, we obtain
uS =
gb
a(g + b) + gb
;
eSg =
ab
a(g + b) + gb
;
eSb =
ag
a(g + b) + gb
:
Now, we are in a position to compare these stationary equilibria. First, the comparison of
measures of the agents in single, state g, and state b among stationary states is as follows:
uE > uS > uV ;(
eEg > e
V
g > e
S
g ; if a > ;
eVg > e
E
g > e
S
g ; if a < ;
eSb > e
V
b > e
E
b :
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We can also dene the divorce rate j in j equilibrium as follows:
V = be
V
b ;
E = ge
E
g ;
S = be
S
b :
Then, we obtain
E > S > V :
This result is fairly intuitive. In an exit equilibrium, a couple chooses to divorce as soon as they
consider their marital condition bad. Therefore, the divorce rate, under such circumstances,
is the highest. On the other hand, in a voice equilibrium, a couple tries to restore its marital
condition, which results in a reduction in the divorce rate, since divorce does not occur in good
marriages. Thus, the divorce rate is the lowest in a voice equilibrium.
Next, we derive the welfare at each equilibrium. The welfare is dened as the average value.
In the voice and stay equilibria, there are three type of agents, single, marriage in a good state,
marriage in a bad state. On the other hand, in an exit equilibrium, there are no agents for
marriages in a bad state. This is because, in this equilibrium, agents select to divorce when the
marriage state switches from good to bad.
Welfare in each equilibrium is
W V = 2yge
V
v + (2yb   v)eVb ;
WE = 2yge
E
g ;
WS = 2yge
S
g + 2ybe
S
b :
Then, the comparison of each equilibrium is as follows:
[w  VE] W V
8<:
>
=
<
9=;WE , 12v
8<:
<
=
>
9=;    ag + ayg + yb;
[w  ES] WE
8<:
>
=
<
9=;WS , yb
8<:
<
=
>
9=; ag + ayg;
[w   SV] WS
8<:
>
=
<
9=;W V , 12v
8<:
>
=
<
9=;  f(a+ b)yg   aybga(g + b) + gb :
The optimal option is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Note that Line w-VE is upward and
Line w-SV is downward.5 We distinguish two cases: a >  and a <  .
5Throughout this paper, we adopt a convention, i.e., the cuto¤ line of a condition, such as [w-VE], is called
Line w-VE.
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4 A Couples Game in Bad Marital State
The situation that a couple faces when its marital state becomes bad is a kind of game played
by both spouses. Before investigating the stationary equilibrium at full length, we clarify the
equilibrium conditions of the couples game in a bad marital state under each divorce law.
The point is that spouses may need to coordinate in order to exercise one option. The voice
option always needs to be coordinated. The exit option needs to be coordinated only under
the mutual-consent divorce law. This brings about di¤erent equilibrium conditions between two
divorce laws.
In the present paper, we use iteratively (weakly) undominated equilibrium as an equilibrium
concept. Iteratively undominated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that survives against an iter-
ative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Generally, a result of the iterative elimination
of weakly dominated strategies is dependent upon the order of eliminations, and, therefore, an
iteratively undominated equilibrium is often thought to be problematic. However, it is veried
that, in the games we consider in the present paper, the order of iteration does not matter. For
example, Marx and Swinkels (1997) show that an order of iteration does not matter in the class
of games satisfying a TDI condition. It is veried that any version of the couples game in the
present paper satises the TDI condition.
Let ji be is payo¤when j option is exercised by the couple. These payo¤s are endogenously
derived in later analysis. Throughout this section, we use the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 For each i =M;F , Vi , 
E
i , and 
S
i are all distinct.
Assumption 2
VM   EM  VF   EF ;
VM   SM  VF   SF ;
EM   SM = EF   SF :
These assumptions hold in a later analysis of the matching model. Assumption 1 is made to
circumvent a complicated characterization of equilibria. Since we employ an iteratively undom-
inated equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions are quite complicated when any two distinctive
strategies give the same payo¤. Assumption 2 refers to the situation in which the di¤erence
between the payo¤s received in the voice option and other options of M is lower than F, and the
di¤erence between the payo¤s received in the exit option and the stay option is common for M
and F. This assumption is relevant for the later analysis because we assume there is no di¤erence
between M and F except for the instantaneous voice cost and Ms instantaneous voice cost is
larger than Fs.
4.1 Unilateral Divorce Law
We rst consider the unilateral divorce law. The couples game in a bad marital state is illustrated
by the matrix in Table 1. Each entry is an e¤ective option for the couple.
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M / F V E S
V V E S
E E E E
S S E S
Table 1: The game under the unilateral divorce law
Proposition 1 Let us assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the equilibrium conditions
for each type of equilibria under the unilateral divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: VM > 
E
M and 
V
M > 
S
M .
2. Exit equilibrium: EM > 
V
M and 
E
M > 
S
M .
3. Stay equilibrium: SM > 
V
M and 
S
M > 
E
M .
The formal proof is relegated to Appendix A. A parameter set satisfying the equilibrium
conditions for one type of equilibrium does not overlap with another, and the support of the
union of all the sets covers the entire admissible parameter space. In other words, there is
generically one and only one type of equilibrium in each prole of generic parameter values.
4.2 Mutual-Consent Divorce Law
We next consider the mutual-consent divorce law. The game is illustrated by the matrix in Table
2.
M / F V E S
V V S S
E S E S
S S S S
Table 2: The game under the mutual-consent divorce law
Proposition 2 Let us assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the equilibrium conditions
for each type of equilibria under the mutual-consent divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: VM > 
S
M .
2. Exit equilibrium: EM > 
S
M .
3. Stay equilibrium: SM > 
V
M and 
S
M > 
E
M .
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The formal proof is relegated to Appendix B. Unlike the case under the unilateral divorce
law, there may co-exist multiple equilibria under the mutual-consent divorce law. To be more
precise, if both VM > 
S
M and 
E
M > 
S
M hold, the game has two (pure strategy) equilibria:
(V; V ) and (E;E).
As is clearly evident above, spousal coordination is required to exercise the voice option
in any case. Furthermore, under the mutual-consent divorce law, the exit option must also
be coordinated. Thus, the situation is similar to a coordination game, and, therefore, a
Pareto-inferior option can be exercised due to the coordination failure. In other words, the
mutual-consent divorce law may produce some coordination friction for a couple.
5 Stationary Equilibria in the Matching Model
Based on the previous results, we next characterize the set of stationary equilibria in the matching
model. We assume the utilities are non-transferable.6 Below, we restrict the attention to generic
parameter values. The value functions of each state are as follows:
rUi = a(Gi   Ui);
rGi = yg + g(Bi  Gi);
rBVi = yb   vi + b(Ui  BVi ) + (Gi  BVi );
BEi = Ui;
rBSi = yb + b(Ui  BSi );
where Ui, Gi, and B
j
i are the is value of a single state, the is value of marriage in a good state,
and the is value of a marriage in a bad state when j option is exercised, respectively.
5.1 Unilateral Divorce Law
We rst consider unilateral divorce law. First, in the voice equilibrium (i.e., Bi = BVi ), the value
function is
Gi   Ui = (r + b + )yg + g(yb   vi)
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b) + (r + a)
;
BVi   Ui =
(   a)yg + (r + g + a)(yb   vi)
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b) + (r + a)
;
BSi   Ui =
 a(r + b + )yg + [(r + g + a)(r + b + )  g] yb + agvi
(r + b) [(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b) + (r + a)]
:
It is easily veried that
BVM  BEM < BVF  BEF ;
BVM  BSM < BVF  BSF :
6For the case with transferable utility, see Appendix C.
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In other words, Assumption 2 is satised. Then, Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium
conditions for the voice equilibrium are BVM > B
E
M and B
V
M > B
S
M . These are written down as
[1 VE] v <    a
r + g + a
yg + yb;
[1 VS] v <  f(r + b + a)yg   (r + a)ybg
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
:
Next, in the exit equilibrium (i.e., Bi = BVi ), the value function is
Gi   Ui = yg
r + g + a
;
BVi   Ui =
(   a)yg + (r + g + a)(yb   vi)
(r + g + a)(r + b + )
;
BSi   Ui =
 ayg + (r + g + a)yb
(r + g + a)(r + b)
:
It is easily veried that
BEM  BVM  BEF  BVF ;
BEM  BSM = BEF  BSF :
In other words, Assumption 2 is satised. Then, Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium
conditions for the exit equilibrium are BEM > B
V
M and B
E
M > B
S
M . These are written down to
[1 EV] v >    a
r + g + a
yg + yb;
[1 ES] yb < a
r + g + a
yg:
Lastly, in the stay equilibrium (i.e., Bi = BVi ), the value function is
Gi   Ui = (r + b)yg + gyb
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
BSi   Ui =
 ayg + (r + g + a)yb
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
BVi   U
=
(   a)(r + b)yg + [(r + g + a)(r + b) + g] yb   [(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)] vi
(r + b + ) [(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)]
:
It is easily veried that
BSM  BVM  BSF  BVF ;
BSM  BEM = BSF  BEF :
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In other words, Assumption 2 is satised. Then, Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium
conditions for the stay equilibrium are BSM > B
V
M and B
S
M > B
E
M . These are written as
[1  SV] v >  f(r + b + a)yg   (r + a)ybg
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
[1  SE] yb > a
r + g + a
yg:
Proposition 3 For generic parameter values, the equilibrium conditions under the unilateral
divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: [1-VE] and [1-VS].
2. Exit equilibrium: [1-EV] and [1-ES].
3. Stay equilibrium: [1-SV] and [1-SE].
The equilibrium under a unilateral divorce law is illustrated in Figure 3 when r = 0, i.e.,
there is no real friction for a time-consuming search activity. It is conrmed that the positive
discount factor per se is the source of some ine¢ ciency. In other words, under both unilateral
and mutual-consent divorce law, the stay option is excessively chosen with respect to the voice
and exit options. In this case, the advantage of voice and exit lies in the future and is then
discounted (see Figures 9-10 and Figures 12-13).
Figures 4 and 5 show the incongruence between the real equilibrium and the optimal one
when r = 0. It is evident that the ine¢ ciency is due to the asymmetry of voice costs for a couple.
When  > 12 , from Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the region in which the economy is at the
voice equilibrium is narrower than that in which the optimal equilibrium is achieved by the voice
option. This is because there are cases in which the agent with  > 12 does not agree with the
voice option even if the other agent selects the voice option. Under a unilateral divorce law, the
agent who is in a marriage in a bad state can divorce without agreement by the other agent.
Then, agents who bear the high costs of the voice option reject the voice and choose to divorce
when yb  ag+ayg, v >  ag+ayg + yb, and (1   )v   ag+ayg + yb. In this case, the agent who
has  wants to divorce, while the agent with 1   wants to select the voice option.
When yb  ag+ayg, v 
f(b+a)yg aybg
gb+a(g+b)
, and (1   )v < f(b+a)yg aybggb+a(g+b) , the agent with 
selects the stay option, while the agent with 1   wants to select the voice option. However, the
voice equilibrium is not realized without the agreement of both the husband and wife. Therefore,
in this case, the economy is in the stay equilibrium.
When  6= 12 , agents want to select di¤erent options for each other under some parameter
values. In this marriage and divorce model, behavior of one agent in the couple inuences the
utility of the other agent. Then, behavior of an agent have externality to the other agent. When
the option of one of the agents conicts with that of the other, realized equilibrium is inuenced
by the divorce law.
Under a unilateral divorce law, if one agent wants to divorce, the realized equilibrium is the
exit (divorce) equilibrium. In this case, the utility of the agent with 1   is lower than the case
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of the voice equilibrium. Thus, under a unilateral divorce law, at the equilibrium, there may be
more divorces than is optimal.
Here, we discuss the e¤ect of r. From r = 0, as r grows,
 Line 1-ES goes down in parallel,
 Line 1-VE goes
 down in parallel when a >  ,
 up in parallel when a <  , and
 Line 1-VS goes ambiguously.
As r becomes positive, the incongruence between the stationary equilibrium and the rst
best option is enlarged. The intuition is that the advantage of voice or exit lies in the future and
is, therefore, discounted.
On the other hand, the trade-o¤ between voice and exit is subtler. Voice is excessive if
a >  while exit is excessive if a <  . The condition a >  implies that it is more likely for an
agent in a bad marital condition to obtain a marriage in a good condition by exit than by voice.
Nevertheless, an agent is reluctant to exit due to discounting. A similar logic applies to the case
of a <  .
Remark 1 When r = 0, the equilibrium and the optimum coincide if the utility of a couple is
transferable (see Appendix C).
5.2 Mutual-consent Divorce Law
We next consider mutual-consent divorce law. The value function is the same as that under a
unilateral divorce law. The Proposition 2 then suggests the following equilibrium conditions:
Proposition 4 For generic parameter values, the equilibrium conditions under the mutual-
consent divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: [1-VS].
2. Exit equilibrium: [1-ES].
3. Stay equilibrium: [1-SV] and [1-SE].
The region surrounded by Line 1-VS and Line 1-ES has multiple equilibria, voice and exit.
The equilibrium under mutual-consent divorce law is then illustrated by Figure 6 when r = 0.
In the region surrounded by Line 1-VS and Line 1-ES, either the voice equilibrium or exit
equilibrium is realized. In this region, the stay option brings both agents about the lowest
utilities of the three options. Under mutual-consent divorce law, both the voice and divorce
(exit) options need the agreements of both agents for realization. If neither agent agrees with
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the other, the couple chooses the stay equilibrium, which lowers the utility of both agents. If
both agents then agree with one of the two options, neither one has an incentive to choose one of
the other options. It is noteworthy that multiple equilibria are also caused by the mutual-consent
divorce law in the case of transferable utility (see Proposition 6 in Appendix C).
The region surrounded by Line 1-VS and Line 1-ES is the coexistence equilibrium, in which
both couples that select the voice option and those that select the exit option coexist. In this
region, we can derive the stationary conditions as follows:
uCa+ eCb  = e
C
g g;
eCg g = e
C
b (b + );
uCa = (1  )eCg g + eCb b;
where 0    1 represents the share of couples that select the voice option when they enter
into a marriage in a bad state. From the equations above and uC + eCg + e
C
b = 1,
uC =
(1  )g(b + ) + bg
(a+ (1  )g)(b + ) + g(a+ b) ;
eCg =
a(b + )
(a+ (1  )g)(b + ) + g(a+ b) ;
eCb =
ag
(a+ (1  )g)(b + ) + g(a+ b) :
It is clear that, when  = 1, uC = uV , eCg = e
V
g and e
C
b = e
V
b . When  = 0, u
C = uE ,
eCg = e
E
g , and e
C
b = e
E
b . The equilibrium value of  depends on the behavior of each couple,
and any value of  in [0; 1] is consistent with the stationary conditions. In the region in which
voice-couples and exit-couples coexist, the equilibrium value of  is determined by the social
culture, norm, values, and religion.
From Figures 3 and 6, it is clear that, under the mutual-consent divorce law, the region in
which voice and exit are an equilibrium option is narrower than under unilateral divorce law.
Under mutual-consent divorce law, both voice and exit (divorce) need the agreement of husband
and wife, while, under unilateral divorce law, voice requires agreement, and exit is realized
without agreement. In the region surrounded by Line1-VE and Line 1-VS, the economy is at the
exit equilibrium under unilateral divorce law, while both voice-couples and exit-couples coexist
under mutual-consent divorce law. In this region, the share of exit-couples is determined by the
social norm, culture, values, and religion.
Figures 7 and 8 show the incongruence between the real equilibrium and the optimal one.
When yb  ag+ayg, the comparison of the equilibrium and the optimum is the same in the case of
a unilateral divorce law. The region in which the economy is at the voice equilibrium is narrower
than the optimal one.
When yb  ag+ayg, there are two possibilities: excess divorce or excess voice. It is noteworthy
that there may be some ine¢ ciency even if there is neither real friction nor cost asymmetry. It
occurs due to the existence of multiple equilibria.
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Figures 7 and 8 show that, in the region which is surrounded by Line 1-VE and Line 1-
VS, there is an excess voice, which is not observed under a unilateral divorce law. Under a
unilateral divorce law, only the ine¢ ciency is evident with the excess divorce. In the region that
is surrounded by Line 1-ES and Line 1-VE, exit-couples and voice-couples coexist, and there is
excess divorce.
In the case of excess voice, the switch from a mutual-consent divorce law to a unilateral
divorce law improves the welfare of the economy. However, in the case of excess divorce, the
divorce law cannot inuence on the welfare. The social norm, culture, values, and religion may
improve the welfare, since there are multiple equilibria, and these social factors determine the
divorce rates.
As previously discussed, from r = 0, as r grows,
 Line 1-ES goes down in parallel,
 Line 1-VS goes ambiguously.
The intuition of the e¤ects of r is similar to the discussion of the case of transferable utility.
The advantage of voice or exit lies in future and, therefore, is discounted.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options when their
marital condition becomes bad. Discussion of the e¤ects of the unilateral divorce law and the
mutual-consent divorce law is important. However, there are many complex e¤ects of divorce
law on divorce rates and welfare, as discussed in many papers. We focus on the role of exit
and voicein the marriage market, and, in our paper, we present a new channel of the e¤ects
of divorce law on divorce rates and welfare.
In our paper, we show that, in the case of non-transferable utility, the change in divorce law
inuences the divorce rates and welfare. If a divorce law is unilateral and the voice cost is higher
for the husband (wife) than for the wife (husband), then the husband (wife) may reject the voice
even though it may be an optimal option. Therefore, the voice under unilateral divorce law is
often insu¢ cient relative to the optimal case. In this case, equilibrium divorce rates are higher
than optimal divorce rates.
On the other hand, if divorce law is a mutual-consent law, multiple equilibria occur. Under a
mutual-consent divorce law, the possibility of multiple equilibria brings an ine¢ cient voice, while
the asymmetry of the voice cost induces too many divorces. In this case of multiple equilibria,
divorce rates are determined by social factors, such as culture, norm, and religion. In a society in
which divorce is a bad behavior from an ethical point of view, agents in a bad marital condition
may hesitate to choose a divorce option. They would, therefore, choose a voice option. In such
a society, divorce rates tend to be low when there are multiple equilibria. However, when there
are multiple equilibria, there may be too many couples who select a voice option. Hence, divorce
rates are too low relative to the optimal condition. If the economy is in this condition, the change
of divorce law from mutual-consent to unilateral improves the welfare of the economy.
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In the case of transferable utility, the Coase theorem is conrmed to hold, and the optimal
options are chosen at the equilibrium when a husband and a wife coordinate. However, if a
husband and a wife cannot coordinate, multiple equilibria occur.
In this study, we assume a situation in which an agent is matched with another. It is
always optimal to choose to marry. To relax this assumption, we introduce a match-specic
productivity shock to the basic model. By this extension, we deal with the situation in which
an agent endogenously determines whom he/she is to marry, and, therefore, we can study the
e¤ects of divorce law on marriage rates. In addition, to study the compensation of divorce will
be interesting. They are future research problems.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Jun-ichiro Ishida, Shingo Ishiguro, and Katsuya Takii for their
helpful comments and suggestions. The second and third authors gratefully acknowledge nancial
support from the JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientic Research (A) and a Grant-in-Aid for Young
Scientists (B). Of course, we are responsible for any remaining errors.
References
[1] Allen, D. W. (1992), Marriage and Divorce: Comment,American Economic Review, 82,
679-685.
[2] Becker, G., Landes, E. and R. Michael (1977), An Economic Analysis of Marital Instabil-
ity,Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1141-1187.
[3] Becker, G. (1993), Treatise on the Family, paperback edition, Harvard University Press.
[4] Chiappori, P. A., M. F. Iyigun, and Y. Weiss. (2007), Public Goods, Transferable Utility
and Divorce Laws,IZA Working Paper No: 2646, March.
[5] Clark, S. (1999), Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution,The Economic Journal, 109,
c41-c54.
[6] Fella, G., Mariotti, M., and P. Manzini. (2004), Does Divorce Law Matter? Journal of
the European Economic Association, 2, 607-633.
[7] Friedberg, L. (1998), Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel
data,American Economic Review, 88, 608-627.
[8] Hirschman, A. (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organiza-
tions, and States, Harvard University Press.
[9] Hirschman, A. (1987), Exit and Voice, J. Eatwell, P. K. Newman, and R. H. I. Palgrave,
editors, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, volume 1, Macmillan.
16
[10] Lundberg, Shelly and Pollack, Robert A. (1993), Separate Spheres Bargaining and the
Marriage Market,Journal of Political Economy 101, 988-1010.
[11] Manser, Marilyn and Brown, Murray (1980), Marriage and Household Decision Making:
A Bargaining Analysis,International Economic Review 21, 31-44.
[12] Marx, L. M., and J. M. Swinkels (1997), Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance,
Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 219-245.
[13] Matouschek, N., and I. Rasul (2008), The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories
and Evidence,Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming.
[14] McElroy, Marjorie B., and Horney, Mary Jean (1981), Nash-Bargained Household Deci-
sions: Towards a Generalization of the Theory of Demand,International Economic Review
22, 333-349.
[15] Mortensen, D. T., and C. A. Pissarides (1994), Job creation and Job destruction in the
theory of unemployment,Review of Economic Studies, 61, 397-415.
[16] Peters, E. (1986), Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contract-
ing,American Economic Review, 76, 437-454.
[17] Peters, E. (1992), Marriage and Divorce: Reply,American Economic Review, 82, 686-693.
[18] Rasul, I. (2006), Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws,Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 22, 30-69.
[19] Stevenson, B. (2007), The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specic Capital,Journal
of Labor Economics, 25, 75-94.
[20] Stevenson, B., and J. Wolfers (2006), Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws
and Family Distress,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 267-288.
[21] Wickelgren, A. (2006), Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for non Contractible Marital
Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce,unpublished manuscript, University of
Texas at Austin.
[22] Wolfers, J. (2006), Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation
and New Results,American Economic Review, 96, 1802-1820.
[23] Zelder, M. (1993), Ine¢ cient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of
No-Fault Divorce,Journal of Legal Studies, 22, 503-520.
17
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Under the unilateral divorce law, the voice option is exercised only by action prole (V; V ).
Then, the equilibrium conditions for the voice equilibrium are, for i =M;F ,
Vi > 
E
i ;
Vi > 
S
i :
It is veried that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, these conditions boil down to VM > 
E
M and
VM > 
S
M .
Moreover, under the unilateral divorce law, the exit option is exercised by action proles
(E;E), (E; V ), (V;E), (E;S), or (S;E). The equilibrium conditions for each action prole are
(E;E): EM > 
V
M , 
E
M > 
S
M , 
E
F > 
V
F , 
E
F > 
S
F .
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(E; V ): EM > 
V
M , 
E
M > 
S
M , 
V
F > 
S
F > 
E
F .
(V;E): VM > 
S
M > 
E
M , 
E
F > 
V
F , 
E
F > 
S
F .
(E;S): EM > 
S
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
(S;E): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
E
F > 
S
F .
However, if EM   SM = EF   SF , a possible equilibrium action prole is only (E;E). Then,
under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium conditions for the exit equilibrium are reduced to
EM > 
V
M and 
E
M > 
S
M .
Lastly, under the unilateral divorce law, the stay option is exercised by action proles (S; S),
(S; V ), or (V; S). The equilibrium conditions for each action prole are
(S; S): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
(S; V ): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
S
F > 
E
F , 
V
F > 
S
F .
(V; S): SM > 
E
M , 
V
M > 
S
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
Then, it is veried that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium conditions for the stay
equilibrium are reduced to SM > 
V
M and 
S
M > 
E
M .
7 If we use a (possibly not iteratively) undominated equilibrium as an equilibrium concept, an equilibrium (E;E)
requires neither EM > 
V
M nor 
E
F > 
V
F , and then an exit equilibrium may co-exist with a voice equilibrium even
under a unilateral divorce law.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Under the unilateral divorce law, the voice option is exercised only by action prole (V; V ). The
equilibrium conditions for voice equilibrium are, then, for i =M;F ,
Vi > 
S
i :
Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, these are reduced to VM > 
S
M .
In addition, under the mutual-consent divorce law, the exit option is exercised only by action
prole (E;E). The equilibrium conditions for exit equilibrium are then, for i =M;F ,
Ei > 
S
i :
Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, these are reduced to EM > 
S
M .
Lastly, under the mutual-consent divorce law, the stay option is exercised by action proles
(S; S), (S; V ), (V; S), (S;E), (E;S), (V;E), or (E; V ). The equilibrium conditions for each action
prole are
(S; S): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
(S; V ): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
V
F > 
S
F > 
E
F .
(V; S): VM > 
S
M > 
E
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
(S;E): SM > 
V
M , 
S
M > 
E
M , 
E
F > 
S
F > 
V
F .
(E;S): EM > 
S
M > 
V
M , 
S
F > 
V
F , 
S
F > 
E
F .
(V;E): VM > 
S
M > 
E
M , 
E
F > 
S
F > 
V
F .
(E; V ): EM > 
S
M > 
V
M , 
V
F > 
S
F > 
E
F .
However, if SM EM = SF  EF , the possible equilibrium action proles are then only (S; S),
(S; V ), and (V; S). Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium conditions for the stay
equilibrium are reduced to SM > 
V
M and 
S
M > 
E
M .
C Transferable Utility
In this appendix, stationary equilibria are characterized as those in which the utilities are trans-
ferable in a couple or monetary transfer between them can be made. To simplify things, a
monetary transfer is made such that one persons surplus is equal to the partners. In addition,
we restrict attention to generic parameter values.
Let Ui, Gi, and B
j
i be the is value of the single state, the is value of marriage in a good
state, and the is value of marriage in a bad state when the j option is exercised, respectively.
In addition, let tGi and t
j
i be the monetary transfer for i with the beginning of good marital
19
state and the monetary transfer for i when j option is exercised, respectively. It must hold that
tjM + t
j
F = 0.
The value functions of each state are then as follows:8
rUi = a(t
G
i +Gi   Ui);
rGi = yg + g(t
B
i +Bi  Gi);
rBVi = yb   vi + b(Ui  BVi ) + (Gi  BVi );
BEi = Ui;
rBSi = yb + b(Ui  BSi );
where Bi = B
j
i and t
B
i = t
j
i if j option is exercised on the equilibrium path. The transfer is
determined as
1
2
(G  U) = tGi +Gi   Ui;
1
2
(Bj  D) = tji +Bji  Di;
where Di is the is default value dependent upon which divorce law applies. Hereafter, we denote
tj = tjM .
C.1 Unilateral Divorce Law
Under unilateral divorce law, the default option in a bad marital state is an exit option, i.e.,
Di = B
E
i and t
B
i = t
E
i . Moreover, t
E = 0.
In the voice equilibrum, since Bi = BVi and t
B = tV , the value functions and monetary
transfers at the voice equilibrium are as follows:
tGi +Gi   Ui =
(r + b + )yg + g(yb   12v)
(r + g + a)(r + b + ) + g(a  ) ;
tVi +B
V
i   Ui =
(   a)yg + (r + g + a)(yb   12v)
(r + g + a)(r + b + ) + g(a  ) ;
tSi +B
S
i   Ui =
 a(r + b + )yg + [(r + g + a)(r + b + )  g] yb + ag 12v
(r + b) [(r + g + a)(r + b + ) + g(a  )] ;
tG = tS = 0;
tV =
(2   1)v
2(r + b + )
:
It is easily veried that
(tVM +B
V
M )  (tEM +BEM ) = (tVF +BVF )  (tEF +BEF );
(tVM +B
V
M )  (tSM +BSM ) = (tVF +BVF )  (tSF +BSF ):
8 In this formulation, it is implicitly assumed that there is no monetary transfer in a divorce caused by the
arrival of the Poisson shock from a bad marital state. This assumption is made only for simplication of analysis.
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In other words, Assumption 2 holds. Then, the equilibrium conditions are tV +BVM > t
E +BEM
and tV +BVM > t
E +BSM . These are written down to
[e VE] 1
2
v <
   a
r + g + a
yg + yb;
[e VS] 1
2
v <
 f(r + b + a)yg   (r + a)ybg
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
:
Next, in the exit equilibrium, since Bi = BEi and t
B
i = t
E
i , the value functions and monetary
transfers at the exit equilibrium are
tGi +Gi   Ui =
yg
r + g + a
;
tVi +B
V
i   Ui =
(   a)yg + (r + g + a)(yb   12v)
(r + g + a)(r + b + )
;
tSi +B
S
i   Ui =
 ayg + (r + g + a)yb
(r + g + a)(r + b)
;
tG = tS = 0;
tV =
(2   1)v
2(r + b + )
:
It is easily veried that Assumption 2 holds, then the equilibrium conditions are tE + BEM >
tV +BVM and t
E +BEM > t
S +BSM . These are written down to
[e EV] 1
2
v >
   a
r + g + a
yg + yb;
[e ES] yb < a
r + g + a
yg:
Lastly, in the stay equilibrium, since Bi = BSi and t
B
i = t
S
i , the value functions and monetary
transfers at the exit equilibrium are
tGi +Gi   Ui =
(r + b)yg + gyb
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
tSi +B
S
i   Ui =
 ayg + (r + g + a)yb
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
tVi +B
V
i   Ui
=
(   a)(r + b)yg + [(r + g + a)(r + b) + g] yb   [(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)] 12v
(r + b + ) [(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)]
;
tG = tS = 0;
tV =
(2   1)v
2(r + b + )
:
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It is easily veried that Assumption 2 holds, and then the equilibrium conditions are tS +BSM >
tV +BVM and t
S +BSM > t
E +BEM . These are written down to
[e  SV] 1
2
v >
 f(r + b + a)yg   (r + a)ybg
(r + g)(r + b) + a(r + g + b)
;
[e  SE] yb > a
r + g + a
yg:
Then, we obtain the formal result.
Proposition 5 For generic parameter values, the equilibrium conditions under the unilateral
divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: [e-VE] and [e-VS].
2. Exit equilibrium: [e-EV] and [e-ES].
3. Stay equilibrium: [e-SV] and [e-SE].
If r = 0, i.e., agents are innitely patient, the optimal option is always chosen at equilibrium.
This is because there is no real friction for a time-consuming search activity in this case.
However, as r becomes positive, there is incongruence between the stationary equilibrium and
the rst best option, because each agent, to some extent, discounts a stream of future payo¤s.
This situation is illustrated by Figures 9 and 10. First, the stay option is excessively chosen
with respect to the voice and exit options. The intuition is that the advantage of voice or exit
lies in the future and is, therefore, discounted.
On the other hand, the trade-o¤ between voice and exit is more subtle. Voice is excess if
a >  , while exit is excess if a <  . The condition a >  suggests that it is more likely for an
agent in a bad marital condition to obtain a marriage in a good condition by exit than by voice.
Nevertheless, an agent is reluctant to exit due to discounting. A similar logic applies to the case
of a <  .
C.2 Mutual-Consent Divorce Law
Under mutual-consent divorce law, the default option in a bad marital state is Di = BSi and
tBi = t
S
i . Moreover, t
S = 0.
It will be veried that each persons surplus under a mutual-consent divorce law is the same
as that under a unilateral divorce law. However, when a couple cannot coordinate, there may
co-exist Pareto-rankable multiple equilibria. In other words, the Coase theorem does not hold.
Similarly, as was reported in the previous section, we obtain the formal result.
Proposition 6 For the generic parameter values, the equilibrium conditions under the mutual-
consent divorce law are as follows:
1. Voice equilibrium: [1-VS].
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2. Exit equilibrium: [1-ES].
3. Stay equilibrium: [1-SV] and [1-SE].
In other words, the equilibrium conditions are the same as those in the case of non-transferable
utility (Proposition 4).
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Figure 6: Equilibrium with mutual-divorce law when r=0 ( τ>a ) 
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[broken line] when r=0 ( τ>a ) 
E
SV
EV,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v
by  
Figure 10: Welfare [solid line] and Equilibrium [broken line] when 0r>  ( τ<a )
E
S
V  
v
by  
Figure 9: Welfare [solid line] and Equilibrium [broken line] when 0r>  ( τ>a )
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Figure 11 : Equilibrium with mutual-divorce law when 0r>  ( τ>a ) 
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Figure 12: Welfare [solid line] and Equilibrium [broken line] when 0r>  ( τ>a )
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Figure 13: Welfare [solid line] and Equilibrium [broken line] ( τ<a ) 
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